Interessant3 Long Form #1 - On X and the Paradox of Tolerance
Should X be forbidden?
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On X and the Paradox of Tolerance
Recently, there has been widespread discussion on the internet about banning links to the social media platform X. The reason that triggered this was Elon Musk’s recent gesture at Trump’s innauguration being considered sufficient proof that he is a National Socialist, and therefore abhorrent (needless to say). Answering what makes allowing access to a societal forum morally acceptable is too wide a scope for a simple essay, so to narrow down on this particular case, we will be asking ourselves the following questions:
When should someone’s actions be forbidden?
Does Elon Musk’s recent behaviour fit these criteria?
To answer the first question, discussions on subjects of what we deem to be tolerable moral actions in a liberal democracy typically centre around an argument made by Karl Popper in one of his two main books - The Open Society and its Enemies - called the Paradox of Tolerance. Here’s the original formulation:
Less well known [than other paradoxes] is the paradox of tolerance: Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them. In this formulation, I do not imply, for instance, that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies; as long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion, suppression would certainly be most unwise . But we should claim the right to suppress them if necessary even by force; for it may easily turn out that they are not prepared to meet us on the level of rational argument, but begin by denouncing all argument; they may forbid their followers to listen to rational argument, because it is deceptive, and teach them to answer arguments by the use of their fists or pistols. We should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant. We should claim that any movement preaching intolerance places itself outside the law and we should consider incitement to intolerance and persecution as criminal, in the same way as we should consider incitement to murder, or to kidnapping, or to the revival of the slave trade, as criminal.
What Popper is saying here can be simply summarised as an application of the principle of negative liberty at a societal level: in essence, we can allow people to hold whatever views they wish, as long as they don’t impose them on others. Tolerance is the practice of permitting, respecting, and allowing the existence of beliefs, behaviors, or practices that differ from one's own, without persecution or suppression.
This paradox is often misunderstood because tolerance has multiple meanings. Intolerance in this paradox is not simply holding a morally unacceptable view about other people, such as not wishing to socialise with classical music fans. It’s forcing a view or behaviour on others. You can even be intolerant by forcing a perfectly banal behaviour on another, say forcing someone to eat British food, but to render this more intuitive, one is intolerant when one physically forces someone do something against their will.1
So now that we’ve understood the Paradox of Tolerance, we can apply it to X’s case. X’s existence is acceptable as long as it is not a vehicle for views or behaviours to be forced on others. The prime candidate for such impositions would be its owner Elon Musk, however, it is evident that not even he does this as a result of X’s existence.
Since we know that we should tolerate someone’s views and behaviours as long as they are not forced on others, we can also answer the second question. For the sake of whether they should be tolerated in an open society, it’s irrelevant what those views or behaviours are. They can be abhorrent, ethical, or banal. They could be dubious territorial claims, wanting to give to the most effective charity, or strongly held views on pescatarian Fridays at the local community centre, it does not matter as long as they are not forced on, or affect, others. Mr. Musk’s actions do not fit the criteria that would justify them being forbidden.
Note that the above answers whether we should permit the existence of and access to X. However, the broader issue being touched on here is whether we should actively use or incentivise the use of X. This is a much more complex discussion. Given that X’s use inherently grants Musk increased visibility, wealth, and influence, one has to at least weigh the platform’s benefits against reservations about how Musk leverages his power. A common counterargument to that suggests that politics should not factor into decisions about the adoption of technologies. This perspective is both simplistic and flawed. To illustrate, one would not embrace a beneficial technology if it directly contributed to harm, such as installing spyware from regimes with poor human rights records like China or Russia.
To have a serious discussion on this topic however, society must examine the broader implications of these platforms. This includes discussions on algorithms, free speech, the rule of law, marginal utility, and more. The conversation cannot be confined to X or Musk alone. Unfortunately, the trigger for this discussion was Musk’s gesture at the inauguration, taken as sufficient evidence he is a Nazi and will therefore impose national socialist race ideology on society if left unopposed, which is a clearly partisan and not a cogent argument. This fails to provide a solid foundation for meaningful debate.
Instead, society should focus on a thorough evaluation of the net benefits and consequences of social media platforms as a whole. Unfortunately, that discussion is not what is currently taking place.
At this point I’ll make a nod to Wittgenstein’s argument that philosophical problems fundamentally arise from linguistic confusion.